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CONCLUSION

..

When faced with one of these vendor-huckster situations, the courts
are confronted with the problem of determining whether 'the defendait
is negligent. If the defendant has violated an applicable statute, the problem is somewhat eased in that the legislature has enacted a standard of
conduct for the defendant to follow. While the courts will not base their
decision solely upon the violation, they have little difficulty in applying
the principles of negligence. In absence of a statute the courts that accept
he doctrine and the situation where the defendant has attracted the
.iere. However, the tendency of late is to recognize the parallels between
th doctrine and the situation where the defendant has attracted the
plaintiff to a position of peril. The problem of finding a duty between
the defendant and plaintiff has caused some courts to deny recovery.
They assert that to hold otherwise would destroy the usefulness of the
defendanes vending truck by imposing an impossible burden upon him.
Those courts that impose a duty maintain that the defendant, having attracted the child to a perilous situation, must use reasonable measures
for his protection. These courts raise the inference that he who seeks to
benefit from the infant purchasers must reasonably attempt to protect
them. Even assuming the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty, some courts
refuse recovery on the basis that the defendant has not caused the plaintiff's injuries. Pointing to the acts of the child or of the other motorist,
they hold that the chain of causation has been broken by their intervening acts. Refusing to accept this, other courts rely heavily upon the
foreseeability ,test and hold that the defendant should have foreseen the
conduct of the child and the presence of the other motorist. While not
necessarily cited in their decision, the courts look to the plaintiff's age
as an underlying factor in determining the duty, if any, of the defendant,
the awareness of the plaintiff of the peril, and his own negligence as a
possible intervening cause.
The decision by the court in Mackey 9 represents the more realistic
and better reasoned view. The defendant, having exerted his best efforts
to attract customers, is under a duty to ascertain the perils incident to his
manner of business and to reasonably attempt to protect his business
invitees from these perils. Failing to so act, he should be held liable fdr
those injuries that he could reasonably have prevented. If one of the two
parties must suffer, let it be he who is better situated to prevent the event.
Daniel T. Monte
SECURED TRANSACTIONS:

AFTER-ACQUIRED

PROPERTY v. ANTECEDENT DEBT
A major trend in state law is the recognition of new methods of financ89

M ackey v. Spradlin, supra note 41.
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ing businesses on the security of assignments of accounts receivable and
inventory. These financing arrangements are designed to encourage loans
for current business operations at reasonable rates on the basis of constantly changing security.
Subject to the general limitations on state powers prohibiting the making or enforcing of any law governing bankruptcy that impairs the obligations of contracts, or conflicts with the national bankruptcy law,1 a
state may pass and enforce "bankruptcy" laws which are binding upon
persons and property within its jurisdiction.
It goes without saying that state laws will be suspended to the extent
.of actual conflict with the Bankruptcy Act,2 and specifically section 60a.
The major question is whether there is an actual conflict between the
Bankruptcy Act and the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.. The Bankruptcy Act considers a transfer for an antecedent debt one of the requisite
elements of a voidable preference; 4 whereas, the UCC provides that
when a secured party gives new value which is secured in whole or in
part by after-acquired property, his security interest in the after-acquired
collateral shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not as security
for an antecedent debt.5 Are the Bankruptcy Act and the UCC in fact
speaking of the same transactions? It will be shown that the afteracquired property provision of the CODE is not in contravention of the
Bankruptcy Act.
Eight elements must coexist before a secured transaction may be set
aside as preferential. The first three of these elements are always present
in a financing arrangement, namely (1) a transfer by way of security of
.(2) the debtor's property (3) to a creditor. The question determining
;whether this transaction was a voidable preference is: was such transfer
(4) made by the debtor while insolvent (5) within four months of
bankruptcy (6) on account of an antecedent debt (7) with the effect of
enabling the creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some
other creditor of the same class? If so, the transfer may bet set aside if
(8) the creditor had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was
insolvent when the transfer was made. All of these elements are essential
before the bankruptcy court can take the creditor's security away from
him. The two elements which concern us, and which are most difficult
for the referee to prove, are numbers (6) and (7), i.e., a transfer on
account of an antecedent debt with the effect of enabling the creditor
to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of
1
2

International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
Bankruptcy Act, 30 Star. 544 (1898) as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 96a(l)
(Supp.
1965) thereinafter cited as the "Bankruptcy Act," by act section number].
3
Citations are to the 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT WITi COMMENTS, with corresponding Oklahoma citations; the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE is hereinafter reerred4 to as the "CODE" or the "UCC".
Bankruptcy Act § 60a(1), 11 U.S.C.A. § 96a(1) (Supp. 1965).
5
UCC S 9-108; OKLtA STAT. tit. 12a. § 9-108 (1961).
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the same class. Once it can be shown that the transfer was not for an
antecedent debt by bankruptcy terms, there will be no question but that
the creditor is not being afforded a voidable preference but is only
receiving that to which he is entitled.
The UNIFORm ComM CIAL CODE was drafted over a period of many
years by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and The American Law Institute. The men who comprised these
two groups were very knowledgeable lawyers and certainly credence
should be given to their thoughts as reflected in the official comments.
The CODE has been enacted by 43 states,7 the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. That the Congress of the United States has enacted
the CODE for the District of Columbia adds merit to the contention that
there is no real conflict between the UCC and the Bankruptcy Act.
Section 9-108 of the CODE is the section with which we are concerned
here:
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation,
releases a perfected security interest, or otherwise gives new
value which is to be secured in whole or in part by after-acquired
property, his security interest in the after-acquired collateral shall
be deemed to be taken for new value and not as security for
an antecedent debt if the debtor acquires his rights in such
collateral either in the ordinary course of his business or under
a contract of purchase made pursuant to the security agreement
within a reasonable time after new value is given.8
The purportedly conflicting bankruptcy statute reads in part as follows:
A preference is a transfer, as defined in this tide, of any of the
property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on
account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor
while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or
against him of the petition.. ., the effect of which transfer will
be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his
debt than some other creditor of the same class.9
The above bankruptcy section also says that a transfer shall be deemed
to have been made at the time when it became so far perfected that no
bona fide purchaser from the debtor and no creditor could thereafter
have acquired any rights in the10property so transferred superior to the
rights of the transferee therein.
It appears that the only question the courts have recognized as having
sUCC S 9-108, comments 1, 2; see generally official comments throughout
Article 9 of 1962 OFFIcIAL TEXT.
7The States of Vermont, Delaware, Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina,
Arizona, and Utah have not adopted the UCC although it has been under consideration
in all states but Arizona.
8
UCC § 9-108.
9
Bankruptcy Act 5 60a(1); 11 U.S.C.A. § 96a(1) (Supp. 1965).
1PBankruptcy Act § 60a(2); 11 U.S.C.A. S 96a(2) (Supp. 1965).
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been left by the Bankruptcy Act to state law is the determination of what
tgnstimes perfection of a transfer. Therefore, if secion 9-108 in some
way affects the perfection of transfers, it should be recognized in
bankruptcy.
.'As early 'as 1894 courts were deciding issues with regard to what, in
today's vernacular, comes under the classification of "after-acquired" property. The Maine case of Sawyer v,. Long"1 held that a mortgage, which
contained permission to sell the stock and replace the sold articles with
the proceeds of sale and further provided that it should cover the replacements, was valid and the "after-acquired" goods were covered by the
mortgage.
Mitchell v. Winslow, 12 decided in 1843, is the first American case
dearly establishing the rights of the mortgagee upon bankruptcy of the
mortgagor. Here the mortgage (covering machinery and equipment)
contained an after-acquired property provision and was filed properly
under the State's laws at the time the consideration for the mortgage
was given. When the mortgagor became a bankrupt, Mr. Justice Story
found that the mortgage on the after-acquired property was valid and
effective as to the general creditors. Analogizing with present assignments of future claims and expectancies which equity held superior to
the subsequent "legal" claims of other parties, he wrote: ... . 1Ut is true,
that the assignment (mortgage) can have no positive operation to transfer, in presenti property in things not in esse; but it operates by way of
a present contract to take effect and attach to the things assigned, when
afd as soon as they come
in esse; and it may be enforced as such a con13
tract in rei, in equity."
In the Ninth Circuit case of Mason v. Citizens Na'l Trust & Savings
Bank of Los Angeles 14 the court, after holding an after-acquired property clause in a chattel mortgage to be valid, asked: "Why should a transaction like this be condemned, if made in good faith and to secure an
honest debt? .... The interests of the general public are not prejudiced
by any such transaction between the debtor and creditor." '
. In line with the above, one writer,"8 when talking about CODE filings,
voiced the ppinion that once the creditor has declared himself by executing a security agreement and financing statement covering all of his
present and future accounts receivable, inventory, or whatever the collateral may be, all other potential lenders are forewarned that the filing
party ha s made his advance and that all the debtor's collateral as set
1186 Me. 541, 30 At. 111 (1894).

S12 17 Fed. Cas. 527 (No. 9673) (C.C.D. Me. 1943)

(Story, Circuit Justice).

I'Id. at 531.
14 71 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1934).
25 Id. at 254.
18

Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory under Article 9 of the Uniform

Commercial Code and The Preference Problem, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 49 (1962).
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forth in the financing statement has been set apart and will not be available for attachment by, or distribution to, general creditors. This author
then says: "Hence, there appears to be no conflict with the overriding
policy of Section 60-to prevent one creditor from taking or receiving,
as soon as the debtor's position becomes uncertain, something to which
he had no right prior to such time." 3In the field of accounts receivable financing, the courts generally seem
to have been able to look to the purpose of the financing and the necessity for constant change in the accounts, without finding a preference in
accounts coming in just before bankruptcy.' s This means, at least, that
releases and substitutions are not "transfers" and that the "transfer" took
place at the time of the original financing.
Whether any particular assignment of accounts receivable can be upheld as against the assignor's trustee in bankruptcy depends, of course,
upon the applicable state law, i.e. the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE. In
the absence of sanctioning and validating legislation, the assignment,
even though made prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, is likely
to be set aside under the voidable preference provision of the Bankruptcy Act.19
Like accounts receivable, inventory has also become a very necessary
source of business financing. In the artide "'Proceeds' Under the Uniform Commercial Code," 2 0 the writer gave a very poignant plea for the

acceptance of inventory financing without it becoming a preference under
bankruptcy. His comments were as follows:
The paradox of Heraclitus is applicable to the flow in inventory
into proceeds and back again: you cannot step twice into the
same river. Doubtless this would have seemed absurb to Huck
Finn as he waded into the Mississippi, but to the philosophically
minded, a river is constantly changing in its flow toward the
sea; so is its observer. The paradox suggests the process of
change in all life. However, admitting that we cannot step
twice into the same stage of a river does not require a corresponding admission that we cannot step twice into the Mississippi River, whether it is in flood stage or sluggish flow; for
obviously we can. Our intelligence provides a physical referent
for the verbal term. And obviously common sense and ordinary
usage of language provide a comparable referent when we speak
of the flow of inventory and proceeds. No one could possibly
be misled by a filed financing statement covering all of the
inventory of a named debtor located at a specific address. Of
17Id. at 65.
18
Walker v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 217 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1954).
1'9 ndustrial Packaging Prods. Co. v. Fort Pitt Packing Int'l, Inc., 399 Pa.,
643,20161 A.2d 19 (1960).

Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commerci4 Code, 65 COLUtM. L.

REv. 232 (1965).
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course, the inventory changes-but any collateral changes. Sales
and replacement of automobiles in a dealer's showroom are
simply more obvious than submicroscopic changes in a pledged
stock certificate, whose value on the exchange may fluctuate
wildly, though perhaps in an intangible fashion. It is curious
that some lawyers have difficulty in conceiving of inventory as
a financible unit when no one has any problem in identifying
the Mississippi River as a conceptual unit.21
The author also used a very interesting analogy with regard to inventory in a paper which he delivered before the 39th annual Conference of
the National Association of Referees in Bankruptcy on October 27,
1965.22 Our relator told the story of a farmer who proudly exhibited an
axe that had been in his family for a hundred and fifty years. It had had
four new heads and seven new handles, but to the farmer it was the same,
the original axe. No one is ever misled when what is being financed is
the inventory of a named debtor and this is revealed in the public records.
What23is being financed is whatever that inventory is at any particular
time.
It is difficult to conceptualize how the referee in bankruptcy can claim
that new accounts, inventory or the proceeds thereof, are not valid security for the creditor when he has put the world on notice of his security
interest by filing a financing statement. How can it logically be claimed
by the referee that these were "transfers" on account of an antecedent
debt with the effect of enabling the creditor to obtain a greater percentage
of his debt than some other creditor of the same class? This contention
is difficult to understand when it was within the contemplation of the
parties that a security interest should attach to the accounts receivable,
the inventory and proceeds thereunder and the state's law was complied
with by filing a financing statement to this effect.
The requirements for perfecting a valid security interest are simple.
The security interest must attach and it must be perfected. In essentially
every case, perfection will be by filing a financing statement. The requirements for attachment are likewise simple. There must be an agreement
(in writing and signd by the debtor), the secured party must have given
value, and the debtor must have rights in the collateral. These events
may occur in any order and, if filing preceded any of these events, perfection occurs when the last of these events takes place 24
When these steps have been taken, according to one writer, the security interest is perfected and the transaction is invulnerable so far as the
21 Id. at 233, 234.
22 Henson, § 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code and S 60a of tho Bank.
fuptcy Act Reconciled, 21 BUs. LAW. 371 (January, 1966).
23 Id. at 375.
24 It re United Thrift Stores, Inc., 4 CCH INSt. CRED. GuIDE 5 98682 (D. N.J.
1965); UCC 9-303(1).
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trustee in bankruptcy is concernedV 5 There appears to be no logical
reason why this should not be so where there is an applicable state
statute, and this is exactly what the CODE provides.
No one denies that in the now-antiquated 26 case of Benedict v.
Rather,27 the kind of financing we are talking about could have been
carried on in a revolving fashion with continuing pay-overs and new
loans had the secured party exercised proper dominion over the collateral claimed. The CODE transaction gets to precisely the same end with
public knowledge of exactly what is happening. Whether the financing
pattern is revolving or "stationary," everybody who is interested may,
with reasonable inquiry, know what is going on and in neither case is
the security interest effective for more than the amount of the outstanding debt.
The after-acquired property provision of the UCC creates a situation
quite distinct from that forbidden by section 60. Although the security
interest does not technically attach to the after-acquired collateral until
28
it is received by the debtor, since the CODE permits advance publication
the lien does attach automatically upon receipt of the goods. For all practical purposes, because the CODE has created a truly automatic shifting
lien, the interest in the after-acquired collateral could be regarded as
being perfected from the time the security interest was first granted. "One
possible approach would be to regard as the only transfer in this situation the one made when the 'shifting lien' first attaches to give the security holders an indefeasible hold on the debtor's inventory." 2 9 If the
interest first attaches to specific goods when the advance is made, it is
contemporaneous with the giving of value and is, therefore, not for an
antecedent debt.
Section 9-108 provides that "new value" must be given by the secured
party at the time the security interest attaches. Although this phrase is not
specifically defined, comment 2 under this section" ° says that making
an advance, incurring an obligation, and releasing a perfected security
interest are all illustrations of "new value." The authors go on to say
that in other situations it is left to the courts to distinguish between
"new" and "old" value, beween present considerations and antecedent
debts.
If secured transactions are thought of in terms of old-fashioned chattel
mortgages, covering only specifically identified chattels, then a transfer
will be said to have occurred, only in the narrowest sense, at the outset.
But, there is no reason why the law should not move with the times.
25 Henson, op. cit. supra note 22, at 374.

26

UCC § 9-205, comments 1, 2, and 3.
27 263 U.S. 353 (1925).
2SUCC 5 9-303(1); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12a, § 9-303(1) (1961).
2
9 Gordon, op. cit. supra note 16, at 68. This reasoning also applies to accounts

receivable.
30 UCC § 9-108, comment 2.
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If we understand inventory and accounts receivable financing to be literally defined-that is, the financing of inventories and accounts and whatever items may from time to time compose them-then there is no
transfer after the date the original secured transaction has been perfected;
which is generally long in advance of the four months preceding bankruptcy. "Perfection would have occurred when the last of four events
happened: a financing statement was filed, a security agreement was
duly entered into, the debtor had rights in the collateral, and value was
given." 31 It has been said: "After-acquired property would be deemed
to be taken for new value because it was acquired in the ordinary course
of business, and it would be, in fact, substitute collateral. The property
simply is not 'transferred' and there is no question of antecedent debt,
at the inception of the financing,
for new value was necessarily given
32
the time the transfer was made."
In commenting on section 9-108, one lawyer voiced the belief: ...
[Where a financier has put new money into a debtor's business to
finance constantly changing collateral, the security interest in the new
collateral is taken for new value where the debtor's rights are acquired
in the ordinary course of business....,,as
In an article which appeared in the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review,3 - the contributor had this to say about the time when a transfer is deemed to have been made:
The very acquisition of future property by the debtor operates
automatically to extend the secured party's superior interest
to that property, not through some latter supplemental action
necessarily invoking the doctrine of relation back, but by force
of the after-acquired property clause of the security agreement
itself. That agreement constitutes a single unitary transaction
contemplating future acquisitions but whose future acquisitions,
as part and parcel of the original agreement, are immediately
perfected seriatim; they are not to be considered subsequent
transfers for a then antecedent debt since they are controlled
by operation of law upon acts of the parties consummated as
of the date of the execution and filing of notice of the agreement.35
The authors of the CODE say that two tests must be met under section
9-108 for an interest in after-acquired property to be one not taken for
an antecedent debt. "First, the secured party must, at the inception of
the transaction, have given new value in some form. Second, the afteracquired property must come in either in the ordinary course of the
31

Henson, op. cit. supra note 20, at 249.

32 Ibid.

33 Id. at 236.
84 Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preferenco Challe ge to After-Acquired Propcrty
Clauses under the Code, 108 U PA. L. REy. 194 (1959).
35 Id. at 219.
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debtor's business or as an acquisition which is made under a contract of
after the giving of new
purchase entered into within a reasonable time
value and pursuant to the security agreement." 3 6 The "new value" required
under this section would be the advancing of funds by the creditor at
the time the security interest is granted, which generally would be within
a few days of the filing of a financing statement. The after-acquired
inventory and accounts we are concerned with in this discussion would
arise in the ordinary course of the debtor's re-stocking his inventory or
"turning over" his accounts.
The trustee in bankruptcy poses several threats to the after-acquired
property transaction under the UCC. He may argue that, in fact, what
the debtor and secured party are trying to effect is a "relation back" of
a legal lien which arose only when the debtor acquired the property. "It
is submitted, however, that the term 'relation back' properly applies only
to the situation in which the creditor had an unperfected security interest,
legal or equitable, before the four-month period and then perfected his
37
interest within the period either by taking possession or by recording."
Thus, the lien on after-acquired property is sufficiently perfected when
applicable state laws have been complied with. That is, if a transfer is
for security and if applicable law requires a signed and delivered writing,
and a filing or recording, or other like overt action 3s and such action
has been taken, then the second party will have an enforcible lien under
the state law.
The trustee has also argued that the CODE itself does not provide for
an equitable lien. However, since the equitable lien is not a creature of
statutes, this is not fatal. The question is whether in substantiating the
perfection of our lien we need to resort to an equitable lien theory.
"It is certain from both the language of the CODE and the nature of
the secured status which it affords that its security interest in afteracquired property is 'not merely an "equitable" interest'; it is a recorded,
immediate interest subject to no subsequent gap in perfection." 39
Although the CODE does not recognize so-called equitable liens, it is
of slight importance since the only time the equitable lien theory is
invoked is when there has been a defective effort to create a legal lien.
The CODE requirements for the creation of a legal security interest are
so dearly set forth that resort need not be made to "equitable" considerations. In any case, the Bankruptcy Act does not recognize equitable liens
where means are available to create a legal interest. 40
One noted editorialist suggests: "To the extent available, the ComGOUCC § 9-108, comment 1. (Italicized in original.)
7,Gordon, op. cit. supra note 16, at 68.
3s§ 60a(6), 11 U.S.CA. $ 96a(6); (Supp. 1965).
9 riedman, op. cit. s-upra note 34, at 218.
4095 60a(6), 11 U.S.C. 5 96a(6) (Supp. 1965).
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mercial Code gives a legal lien and to the extent it cannot, it gives under
intended
section 60 a legal equitable lien. This is what the draftsmen
and what section 60 permits the Commercial Code to do." 41 It is submitted that what may come under the nomenclature of an "equitable
lien" under the Bankruptcy Act (and thus be valid as having complied
with applicable state laws) is, in fact, a valid security interest, i.e., a legal
lien, under the UCC. Thus, the CODE need not make provision for the
so-called equitable lien.
In the well-known and often cited Newkirk Mining42 case, involving
after-acquired inventory and equipment, Referee Hiller said: "There can
be no doubt that under the CODE security interests can be made to extend
to after-acquired property...."
The Pennsylvania case of Erb v. Stoner 43 dealt with the seller of a
herd of cows who retained a purchase money security interest in the herd.
The collateral was described not only as the herd which was sold but
also as including the progeny of the herd and any "replacements or additions;' which is another way of saying "after-acquired property." The
farmer turned the entire herd over to the defendant, an auctioneer, and
the latter was held liable in conversion to the secured party not only for
the proceeds of that herd but also for the replacements and additions.
The court emphasized that it was not necessary to support a security
interest in the after-acquired property of the farmer for the holder of
that security interest to make a new advance each time a new cow was
acquired by the farmer.
Before February, 1966, there apparently were no cases decided in a
court of bankruptcy which involved the possible voidable preferences
occasioned by the subsequent attachment of security interests in afteracquired property. However, on February 9, 1966, after research for this
comment had been completed, a decision was rendered by the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon 4 4 which held contrary
to the theories and suggestions that are propounded herein. The court
held that since the secured party gave no new value to the bankrupt
within the four months preceding bankruptcy, any attachment of a lien
upon accounts coming into existence within four months of bankruptcy
constituted a transfer as security for an antecedent debt and, thus, a voidable preference.
This decision will certainly bear watching in the higher courts. If it
is not over-ruled, or over-shadowed by contrary decisions, it will have
41

Keeffe, PractiingLawyer's Guide to the Current Law Magazines, 51 A.B.A.J.
693 (July, 1965).
42Ig re Newkirk Mining Co., 54 BEaKS COUNTY L J. 179 (E.D. Pa., 1962).
43 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 25 (1958).

44 In the Matter of Portland Newspaper Publishing Company, Inc., No. B643282, D. Ore., February 9, 1966, as reported in 4 CCH INST. Cum. Gumn §
98483.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol3/iss2/4

10

